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ABSTRACT
The Electoral College system for selection of the

chief executive of the United States has been described as

undemocratic, archaic, complex, ambiguous,

indirect, and

dangerous, by the American Bar Association. Other noted
scholars, politicians and political scientists have made
numerous attempts to amend the Constitution to any number
of revision plans, notably the proportional plan, the

district plan, and currently, the direct vote plan.

In

addition to all the dozens of reform movements introduced
in Congress each year, numerous commissions, private

studies, and institutes have issued a prodigious amount of
reports. In 1969 a constitutional' amendment to abolish the

Electoral College came within a few votes of passing

Congress.
This thesis briefly reviews the content of Article

II, section 1 of the Constitution which established the
Electoral College (modified by Amendment XII), and the
principal reform plans that have developed over the years.

A serious examination of these reform efforts is examined,
together with their possible effects on the entire

political system.
The Electoral College acts as leverage in a

presidential election, by enhancing the status of minority

iii
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I

groups. iChanging to a direct plan would damage minority

interests since a national popular majority would
overwhelm their votes, The Electoral College contributes
to the political stability of the nation by encouraging

,the two-party system, while the direct vote system would
destroy it. A direct popular election would result in an
unstable, political system characterized by a multitude of
I
parties,; with more radical changes from one administration
to the next. The recent election for president in France,

which has a direct election system for president bears
i
witness to this.
The1 Electoral College maintains the federal

democratic system, and is a paradigm for the whole system
of government. To abolish the Electoral .College in favor a

direct pdpular election for president would strike at the

very heart of the federal structure established by the
I
founding; fathers, and lead to the nationalization of the
I
central government, to the detriment of the states.

i
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ON TRIAL

The 2000 Election
The last lever has been pulled. The last card has

been punched. The curtains have been drawn across the
voting booths. The cards have been packed in boxes to be
sent to1 the electoral officials at each state capital to
be tabulated. Therein begins a procedure, the Electoral

College system, to determine who shall become the next

President of the United States.

What should have been .a straightforward procedure was
turned into a hotly contested race for the presidency
between Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush
of Texas. As early as October, the daily tracking showed

it to be a distinctly close race. The Gallup Poll charted

nine lead changes during the fall campaign. As election
night wore on, claims and counter claims were made for one

winner or another. By 10:06 p.m. Dan Rather commented on

CBS news that it was beginning to look like the advantage
was going to George W. Bush. As votes filtered in from

other istates, the lead shifted from one to the other
candidate, until the drama of Florida unfolded. At one
I
time,.Vice President Gore called Governor Bush with a

1

congratulatory message, but as Bush's lead dwindled, he

sent another message with a disclaimer. On the morning

after the election, the contest in Florida showed Bush
leading Gore by only 926 votes, prompting an automatic

recount. Counts, recounts, and appeals to the courts

continued for five weeks, until finally the Supreme Court
ruled that the recounts be stopped, giving the victory to
George W. Bush. Thus ended the most disputed election
since 1867, when Rutherford B. Hayes defeated Samuel J.

Tilden.

After eighteen months of campaigning, and
expenditures of more than a billion dollars,

it seemed

that Gore was the popular vote winner with a 222,880 vote

lead. As of November 20th, Gore had amassed 49,252,780

popular votes, Bush, 49,036,35

(Caeser & Busch, 2001) . The

predictions of the Electoral College reformers had come

true; for the first time since 1888 the popular vote
winner had lost the presidency.

While the year 2000 election controversy was not the
complete disaster for the Electoral College system that

its opponents had predicted,

it provoked the same

questions that have plagued political scientists and
politicians since the Constitution of 1787 was adopted.

2

The Electoral College, a general-ticket,
winner-take-all system, has been repeatedly attacked,
almost from the day it was adopted, by politicians

demanding a democratic one-man, one-vote plan for choosing
the president. The general-ticket, winner-take-all system

for selection of the president was not constitutionally
mandated, but arose later with the growth of political

parties. Under this system, the state delivers all of its
electoral votes to the popular winner, giving it
significant influence on the final outcome of an election.

To quote Thomas Jefferson,

general ticket,
not to do it"

"If ten choose....by the

it is worse than folly for the other six

(Hardaway,

1994, p. 90). In the

winner-take-all plan, a plurality magnifies the winner's

majority of victory in the electoral vote.

It rewards a

candidate who creates a broad, inclusive national
coalition, and eliminates candidates who do not.
Is the present election system undemocratic, or does
it remain the best system for choosing the chief executive
of the;'world's most prestigious nation? Should the

Electoral College system be revised to more accurately

portray the democratic mood of today's citizens?

9
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Democracy Versus Republicanism
The term democracy is derived from the Greek word
"demokratia", demos meaning people, and kratia meaning
rule.

It is a form of government in which citizens rule

the state. The essential features of democracy are that
citizens are free in speech and assembly, free to form

competing parties, and that voters are able to choose
among the candidates of those parties in regularly held

elections. Democracy is a government by the many,
of by the few.

instead

It is based on the belief that all should

have the same basic rights and freedoms, and that people
should be free to govern themselves. Rights and

responsibilities are not unlimited, however. Some

restrictions are necessary. People may not infringe on the
rights of others, confiscate their property or injure

them.
Citizens of a democracy have freedom of speech and

the press - this is essential to the survival of
democracy. Freedom of speech includes freedom of

expression in all forms of communication including

television, radio, films, theater, dance, music,

literature and painting. The right of free speech, press

and thought includes the'right to publish and read

newspapers, magazines, and books, as long as there is no

4

libel of others. It includes the right to differ, and to
express opinions even though they may be contrary to the
opinions of others.

Democracy confers upon its citizens the freedom of

assembly. They may meet to support, criticize, to debate

governmental policies, to pass resolutions or send
petitions to their elected officials.

At the heart of democracy is the supremacy of the
people, not its governmental officials. Voters have

popular sovereignty - they may keep their officials in
office or remove them by voting them out. Under a
democracy people have political freedom,
rights,

full civil

independence of movement, religious freedom,

free

economic opportunity, and equal educational opportunities

without regard to race, creed, color, or social position.

Democracy is a system of government in which the power to
make important political decisions rests with the
community; a government of the people, by the people, and

for the people. Direct democracy refers to a system of

government whose citizens decide issues by their votes.

With all the above benefits, why was it that the

Founding Fathers in 1787 feared democracy, and elected to

choose' a republican form of government?
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Alexander Hamilton, referring to the Constitutional

Convention in 1787 said,

"We are now forming a republican

form of government. Real liberty is not found in the

extremes of democracy, but in moderate government.

If we

incline too much to democracy, we shall soon shoot into a
monarchy, or some other form of dictator"

(Williams,

2002).
James Madison wrote,

"democracies have ever been

spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been

found incompatible with security or the rights of
property; and have in general been as short in their lives

as they have been violent on their deaths"

(Publius, no.

10, 1996, p. 49).
Madison's

(1961)

answer to the dangers of a direct

democracy was a representative democracy, a system of
government in which the sovereign holds authority granted
by the people, and ruled according to law. Power is
derived from the people through the process of the vote,

and government then operates within, and under the control
of law (In the United States, the Constitution). The

Founding Fathers created the Constitution according to
this concept

(Publius, no.

10,

1961.)

The Constitution is the grant of authority for the

government; it is the law of the people for the control of
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the government. Madison (1961)

interprets a republic as a

government in which a scheme of representation takes
place, or a delegation of the government to a smaller
number of citizens elected by the rest.

Madison (1961) writes,

"The effect,"

"is to refine and enlarge the

public views by passing them through the medium of a

chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country and whose patriotism and
love of justice will beat least likely to sacrifice it to

temporary or partial considerations.... In the extent and
proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a

republican remedy for the diseases most incident to a
republican government"

(p. 50, 52) .

The democratic republican form of government as we

know it in the United States, utilizes the democratic

principle, but limits it by the rule of law, the
Constitution. The people vote for representatives who then
choose those who will govern, and vote on appropriate laws
and measures. The House of Representatives is the most
democratic, being directly chosen by the voters. The

Senate has two members who represent all the voters in his
state, a republican concept. The executive is chosen by

electors, two from each state, the winner then receiving
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all the votes of that state, a decidedly republican

concept.
The most important difference between a democratic

and a republican form of government is the subordination
of the power of the majority to the rule of law. There

must be rules of law to prevent the majority from imposing

their will on the minority through the election process.

The Constitution not only diffuses the powers of
government within the federal government, but also divides
the powers of government between two independent and

sovereign entities, the federal and the fifty states.

The democratic republican form of government

establishes a system of checks and balances, a separation
of powers, and may not be changed by the majority, but

only by an amendment process requiring extraordinary
majorities to propose and ratify. In addition, these

requirements can not be exercised directly by the people,
but only by their elected representatives. By establishing

these safeguards against the absolute rule of a majority,
the Founding Fathers created not a democracy, but a

republic in which the people have a voice, yet
circumscribed by fixed laws, i.e. the Constitution. The
Electoral College was established by these republican

8

principles, and remains a viable system even in the
twenty-first century.

The Electoral College - A Novel System
The members of the Federal Convention meeting in the

summer of 1787 met with no problem as difficult as that of

choosing the method for selecting the chief executive of
the United States. James Wilson, a representative,
speaking on the floor of the Convention,

said that the

subject had "greatly divided the House....It is in truth
the most difficult of all on which we have to decide"

(Publius,

1961, p. 3).

Senator Plumer of Massachusetts felt that the
Electoral College system was decided upon because it was

the least exceptionable than any of the others proposed.

But Abraham Pickering, a member of the formulating
committee, said that,

"late in their session the present

complex mode of electing the president was proposed, that
the mode was perfectly novel, and viewed as the most

pleasing feature of the Constitution"

(Publius,

1961,

p. 4) .

The framers of the Constitution were striving in 1787
to devise a government that would allow the states to

retain certain local powers, but to agree to surrender
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some of the powers necessary to establish the sovereignty
of a nation.

It was necessary to create an almost perfect

balance between retained and delegated powers in order to.
form the framework of federalism necessary for democracy
to flourish. They were familiar with the history of large

countries with strong central control, as well as those
without enough central power,

soon torn by internal

rivalries. The true genius of the American Constitution
was a system of federalism within which democracy could

survive and thrive. Any notion that a sovereign nation
could be founded without taking cognizance of states was

unthinkable. The states were sovereign functioning

governments, each with its own culture and history.
Agreement, compromise, and consensus with the states was
an absolute necessity if the Constitution was to come into

existence

(Publius,

1961). The federal democratic system

which emerged was the result of such accommodation and
consensus.

How the executive was to be chosen was a much
disputed matter. Wilson was for a direct election by the

people. George Mason was fearful of leaving the choice

directly to the people. John Rutledge favored the
selection being made by the second branch of the

legislature. Later, Wilson offered the first proposal of
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an electoral college; he proposed that states be divided
into districts, with qualified voters of the national
legislature electing from their respective districts the

person who would be the chief executive. This plan was at

first rejected, but a consensus later developed in favor
of electors making the actual selection. The issue was

reconsidered, scrapped, and eventually given to the
Committee on Detail, who could come to no agreement. The

issue was then sent to the Committee on Unfinished
Portions, argued, disputed clause by clause, and finally

agreed upon, and sent to the Committee on Style and
Arrangement for final refinement. On September 17th,
the Constitution,

1787,

including the Electoral College system

for selection of the president, was finally adopted by
unanimous consent of all the states present.

!
1

The mode of appointment of the chief magistrate
of the United States is almost the only part of
the system, of any consequence, which has
escaped without severe censure, or which has
received the slightest mark of approbation from
its opponents. The most plausible of these, who
has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit
that the election of the president is pretty
well guarded. I venture to say somewhat further
and hesitate not to affirm, that in the manner
of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent.
It unites in an eminent degree all the
advantages the union was to be wished for.
(Publius, no. 10, 1961, p. 23)
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Madison (1961)

interprets a republic as a government

in which a scheme of representation takes place, or the

delegation of the government to a smaller number of

citizens elected by the rest.
I
writes,

"The effect," Madison

"is to refine and enlarge the public views by

passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest

of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice

will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or

partial considerations.... In the extent and proper
structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican

remedy for the diseases most incident to a republican
government"

(1961, p. 50).

There have been, in its 200-year history, a number of

critics who have proposed reforms to the Electoral College
system, most of them trying to eliminate it. But there are
also staunch defenders of the Electoral College who,

although perhaps less vocal than its critics, offer very

powerful arguments for it.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CONTROVERSIAL ELECTORAL

COLLEGE SYSTEM

The Electoral College system was established in
Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, and modified
I
chiefly by the 12th Amendment. Each state is allocated a

number of electors equal to two senators, and the number
of representatives allowed for each state. This number for

each state may change according to the state's population
as determined by the census. The political parties in each

state submit to the state's election official a list of
individuals pledged to their candidate for president and

equal to the state's electoral vote. States have absolute
authority over the method for selection of electors. These
individuals are usually chosen in state party conventions,

or through appointment by state party leaders, while third
parties and independent candidates merely designate
theirs. Members or employees of the federal government are

prohibited from serving as electors. After caucuses and

primaries, the major parties nominate their candidates for
president and vice president in national conventions. The

names of those nominated are then submitted to each

state's chief election official so that they may appear on
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the general election ballot. On the Tuesday following the

first Monday in November, the people vote by ballot for
the party slate of electors representing their choice for

president and vice president. The presidential ticket
winning the most popular votes in the state,

(except for

Maine and Nebraska, who have two. votes for the entire

state, the rest for each congressional district vote),

is

awarded all the state's electoral votes.

On Monday following the second Wednesday of December,
each state's electors meet in their respective capitals to

cast their electoral votes; one for president and one for
vice president.

In order to prevent favoritism, at least

one of their votes must be for a candidate from a state

other than their own. The electoral votes are then sealed
and transmitted to the President of the Senate, who opens

them on January 6th and reads them before both houses of

Congress. The candidate with a majority of electoral votes
is then declared President of the United States. In the

event that no one wins an absolute majority of electoral

votes for president, the House of Representatives selects
the president from the three topmost candidates receiving
electoral votes, with each state casting one vote, and an
absolute majority being necessary to elect. If no one
receives an absolute majority for vice president, the
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Senate selects from the two topmost candidates for that
office. On January 20th the duly elected President and

Vice President are sworn into office

(Publius,

1961).

Controversies surrounding the Electoral College are
as old as the Constitution itself. More amendments have

been offered on this subject than any other section of the

Constitution. Lawrence D. Longley describes the Electoral
College system as:

A deplorable political institution.... if the
Electoral College were only a neutral and sure
means for counting votes, and aggregating votes,
it would be the subject of little controversy.
The Electoral College, however, is neither
certain in its operation nor neutral in its
effects....In short, the Electoral College is a
flawed means of determining the President. Its
workings at best are neither smooth nor fair,
and at its worst contain the potential for
constitutional crisis....It must be abolished.
(Yunker & Longley, 1976, p. 193)
The American Bar Association has Called the Electoral

College system archaic, undemocratic, unambiguous,
indirect, and dangerous

(Gossett,

1967). Critics find most

troubling the unit-vote, or general-ticket system for

choosing the president and vice president, the faithless
elector, and the contingency election in the House of
Representatives,

in the event no majority is achieved on

the first ballot.

15

The Proportional Plan
In 1906, J. Hampden Dougherty published a

comprehensive account of specific reform measures to avoid

these perils, and a proposed remedy by amendment to the
Constitution. His suggested remedy, the proportional plan,
provides that the vote in every state would be as it is
now in electing the governor. Each person's vote would

count equally in the electoral result in the state in the
ratio to the total number of votes. State authorities
would have the duty to count all the votes for president

and vice president, and to apportion the presidential
electoral votes in the same ratio between the popular vote

and the total vote for all the candidates. Each state
would have the same number of votes in the election of the

president as in the whole number of senators and
representatives to which they have in Congress. The person

having the highest number of electoral votes, including
decimals,

in all the states would be declared president,

the vice president to be chosen in the same way.

In the

event of a tie, the candidate having the largest number in
the aggregate of all qualified voters in all states shall
be awarded the presidency (Dougherty,

1906) . Dougherty

believes that his resolution is an answer to the several
defects in the present Electoral College system. It allows
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each person an equal vote in the presidential election. It

settles all controversy in case of a tie without assigning
the decision to the House of Representatives.

It solves

the difficulties encountered in the present mode

thereof)

(or lack

in counting the electoral votes. The state

continues to be an important part of the electoral

process, as intended by the framers of the Constitution.
State officials would settle any problems arising in the
electoral count. No amendment thus far has entirely
eliminated the probability for election of a minority
president, but proportional plan lessens the possibility

(Dougherty, 1906).
Best thinks that the proportional plan could produce

fundamental changes in political alignments. Allan Sindler

believes that the proportional plan would lead to

one-party domination in elections, and an increase in the
South's political influence (Best, 1975). Lucius

Wilmerding, Jr. concedes that the proportional system is a
reasonably accurate device for taking the sense of the

people and much superior for that purpose than the
general-ticket system, but has doubts on other grounds

(Wilmerding,

1958, p. 332).

First, disputed elections would become more frequent,
I
possibly extending to every state, delaying prompt
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selection of the chief executive. Second, the possibility
exists that the House of Representatives would be of a

different party than the president. The chief objection is

that equal ideological masses of people, rather than
geographical masses are entitled to equal votes, and this
principle should not become a part of governmental

institutions

(Wilmerding,

1958).

The District Plan
In 1832 James Madison wrote to John Jay that the

single-member district plan was the plan of choice when

the Constitution was framed and adopted. In 1834 he

emphasized that it would be a great improvement if
electoral districtand eventual decision by joint ballot of

both Houses could be established (Publius,

1961).

The district plan divides each state into districts

equal to the number of representatives that each state is
entitled to in Congress. Districts shall be contiguous and
compact, containing approximately the same number of

persons each state is entitled to in Congress, and may not
be altered until after the next census.

Inhabitants of

districts qualifying for electors to the House of
Representatives shall choose two electors each for

president and vice president, none holding an office of
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profit or trust under the United States government.
Electors meet in their respective states and vote for

president and vice president. Lists of all persons voted
for shall be certified, sealed, and transmitted to the

President of the Senate, who shall open them and count the
votes. The candidate with the most votes shall be declared
the winner. If no candidate has the required forty

percent’, then the combined Senate and the House with a

majority of members present and voting makes the

selection. Votes are to be taken by states, not by
individual voters.

Proponents of the district system argue that the
sentiments of the people would be taken by districts,
instead of by states, thereby more accurately representing

the will of the people; the president would then be the

choice of the people. They disagree with the
general-ticket system that permits the minority to be

counted for the majority, possibly resulting in the defeat
of the popular choice. An important difference in the two

plans is that the district plan gives the presidential
election a national character, while the present
general-ticket plan gives it a federal one.
Opponents to the district plan cite the distribution

of state votes among several candidates as possibly
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reversing the order of the leaders. A candidate could
receive a majority of district votes, but lose the state
votes unless he could win over half of them.

It is also

argued that the district system is inevitably subject to
gerrymandering; it cannot and will not be operated fairly.

A congressman in 1816, commenting on the district

system said:

'

I had, Mr. Chairman the honor of a seat in the
legislature of New York, when that state last
divided into districts for the purpose of
electing members of this House. How were they
laid off? With the sole view of returning as
many as possible to this House.... counties were
cut and slashed in every direction; districts,
singles, double, and treble, of every shape and
of every size, were manufactured....In short, no
device, however shameful, was omitted to obtain
the result, and the result was obtained.
(Wilmerding, 1958, p. 151, 152)

The district plan would encourage the formation of
minority parties, thus destroying the two-party system,

which has proved to be effective in all but a few isolated
cases of deciding presidential elections in a clear-cut

and prompt manner. A minority party would fight to win

seats in the House of Representatives hoping that the
election would devolve on that body. There is considerable
doubt/ however, about the prospects of a district plan
amendment being approved by Congress. The larger states

would never relinquish the power they now hold under the
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general-ticket plan. Neither would the smaller states

abandon their power to elect their candidate by the equal
vote they now hold in the House of Representatives

(Wilmerding,

1958).

Serious objections have been raised to both the
district plan and the proportional plan; either would
weaken the presidency, localize presidential elections,

compromise the two-party system, and give advantages to
the smaller states. By the late 1960's, demands for a

direct popular vote took center stage. Polls indicated

between seventy-eight and eighty-one percent of the
electorate favored the more democratic one-person one-vote

system (Best, 1975).

Direct Popular Vote Plan

The direct popular vote plan has the approval of a
significant number of politicians and citizens, who cite

it as being as being sensible, democratic, and straight

forward. It allows the people, each having an equal vote
to choose his preference for the chief executive of the

United States. Its proponents believe the direct popular

vote system provides the most direct and democratic way

for selecting the president. In this plan, the people of

the several states and the District of Columbia shall cast
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a single vote for the two persons who have joined their
names as candidates for the office of president and vice
president. The joint-team candidates for president and
vice president having the greatest number of votes,

providing such numbers are at least forty percent of votes
cast, are declared the winners.

If none of the candidates

receive more than forty percent, a runoff election would
be held between the two highest on the list. State

legislatures shall determine the times, places, and manner
of holding such elections. Congress could at any time make

or alter such regulations, and would have the power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation (Gossett,

1958).
The case for direct election has a strong foundation.

Proponents claim that it is the only reform system
propos'ed thus far that remedies all the defects specified
in the current general-ticket system. Plus,

it is the only

reform that has a chance of being adopted in Congress,

judging by the close votes that have occurred in past
attempts.

In 1969, the House passed a direct election

amendment by more than the two-thirds majority, and was

supported by a majority, although not by the necessary

two-thirds of the Senate (Best, 1975). Supporters of
direct election point out that this plan solves the
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"faithless elector" problem, in that electors are
completely eliminated from the amendment. Because they are

not now constrained by the Constitution, they could

possibly play the role of spoiler,

influencing the outcome

of an election.

Supporters of direct election claim that this
amendment will reduce propensity for fraud, because it

will reduce the potential for reward. They argue that less
leverage means less fraud, and that the direct election

system has the less leverage of all.

Direct election prevents a contingency election in
the House of Representatives, a practice long condemned

and feared by many. George McDuffie said in 1826,

"there

cannot be a greater solecism than that which is involved
in the idea of commencing the election of the president
upon one principle, and ending it according to

another....Nothing can be more absurd than to abandon it
entirely as soon as the people at the first effort, fail
to give a majority of vote to one candidate"

(Wilmerding,

1958, p. 185). Thomas Jefferson told his friend George Hay

that he had "ever considered the Constitutional mode of

election ultimately by the legislature voting by states as
the most dangerous blot in our Constitution, and one which

some unlucky chance will someday hit, and give us a pope
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and an anti-pope"

(Publius, 1961, p. 3). Direct plan

advocates suggest that the simplest remedy to this problem
is the instant runoff election whereby the voter selects

his first and second choices on the first ballot. The
candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated,

then the second choices on those ballots are counted until

a winner is obtained.
Finally, advocates assert, the direct-vote system

provides for preservation of federalism, in that it
allocates to state legislatures the time, places, and

manner of holding presidential elections, and entitlement
on the ballot

(Best,

1975).

Charges against the direct popular vote plan are
wide-ranging. Alan Sindler cites the insurmountable
problem of gerrymandering (Best, 1975) . Best alludes to

the dangers of fraud under the direct system, because it
would increase the number of close elections. Under the
contingency provisions, there is a possibility of fraud,
both in the general election and the runoff

(Bickel,

1971). It is possible that the direct-vote plan could

invite non-regional interests that have hopes of amassing

enough votes to be a bargaining influence in a runoff.
With votes aggregated nationwide, numerous contenders
would force a runoff with regularity. The majority party
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would count for much less than it does now. Party unity
would cease to exist; everything would be a preparation

for later coalitions. More open, multi-party politics,

praised by direct-vote adherents, would also offer
opportunities for pressures on one or another causes or

prejudices. The present system allows for coalitions to be
formed in two-party conventions, but under a direct

system, coalitions would be relegated to a few candidates

and their managers, between the election and the runoff.
They would become weaker, with less ability to arrive at

well-founded decisions. There would be less access to the
election process. A direct election would have a profound

effect on the kinds of men who would become president.

If

the national party convention system is superceded by a
national primary, as is foreseen by the direct system,

then party leaders could lose control over the nomination

process. Demagogues, self-nominated, individualistic

leaders of prejudicial factions, charismatic leaders
beleaguering a single issue, might replace the candidate
presently conscripted because of their moderate
experience, records of electoral success, and service to

permanent party organizations. In short, the prospects are

that the direct election plan would increase the incidence
of party-splits, and encourage the development of minor
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parties. It would, undermine party control over the crucial
task of nomination, and postpone compromise.

It would

increase the importance of homogeneous regions and
one-party states, and disturb the geographic distribution
of party support. It would reduce the influence of state

party leaders, and encourage the formation of doctrinaire
and single-issue parties, simplifying and dramatizing
issues

(Best,

1975).
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CHAPTER THREE
IN DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL

COLLEGE

Best has developed a set of standards by which to
judge the merits of an electoral process. First, it should

fill the office; it should produce a swift,

sure, clean,

and clear decision. It should produce a president who can
govern because of sufficient popular support, and who is

independent, thereby supporting the separation of powers.
It should reduce the premium on fraud, and produce

moderate winners who are tolerable to losers. Last, but

not least, it should preserve the federal system. The

present Electoral College system comes very close.to
fulfilling all these requirements.
The president fills an unparalleled role in the

government of the United States. He is the Head of State,
the Commander-in-Chief of the nation's defense forces, the

only person who can speak for the entire nation, and, in

recent times, he has become the leader of the free world.
In the selection of a leader to fill these important

positions, it becomes evident that the election process
"should produce a swift, sure, clean, and clear decision"

(Best;

1975). An election in doubt would prolong the
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process, giving the incoming Head of State little time to

organize the new government. Numerous recounts, or
elections tied up in courts increases the possibility of

fraud, crippling the effectiveness of the office. Any

uncertainty would invite intrigue, not only at home, but
also among foreign enemies. An election in doubt would
prolong the process, giving the incoming Head of State

little time to organize the new government. This not to
say that the present system is devoid of the possibility

of fraud, but it provides for the best practical defense

against it.
The president must not be chosen by Congress, except
as a last resort, because of the strong likelihood that

Congress would control the executive branch of government

The possibility of conspiracies between the two branches

would be a decided detriment to the people. The president
should command at least a plurality, or better still, a

majority of the voters,

in order to have a mandate to

govern. This becomes all the more important when one
considers the complex structure of the nation - the

diverse population, ethnic groups, religions, races, and
economic status. Support for the president must be broad
and deep, widely distributed across the nation. The

present selection procedure is one that can structure and
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shape the majority, forcing the candidates to build a

broad cross-sectional base.

In Defense of Federalism

Federalism is a very important element in the
election process.

"The proper name for the form of

government established by the constitution is a
democratic-federal republic"

(Best, 1996, p. 39), It

maintains the balance of power between the president and

Congress, between national and regional interests. Methods
of selection for both institutions should be the same; if

Congress has a federal base, so should the presidency.

If

the president were chosen from the electorate at large,
that office would claim a more authentic mandate than that
of Congress, affording it more power and prestige than

that of Congress, and at the expense of local interests.

John F. Kennedy, in his now famous quote,

says,

"It

is not only the unit vote for the presidency we are

talking about, but a whole solar system of governmental
power. If it is proposed to change the balance of power of

one of the elements of the solar system,
to consider the others"

(Hardaway,

it is necessary

1994, p.

1).

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of

1787had created this "solar system," a federal-democratic
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form of government, through a process of compromise and

accommodation. They were constrained by the era in which
they lived, by the sentiments of a variety of peoples,

each with their own persuasions and desires. They were a

people recently freed from the yoke of the British,

and

carrying with them an intolerance of any person or group
who would infringe upon their new-found freedoms. The
framers were realists, not idealists, who saw the very
real necessity of forging from this hodge-podge of peoples

and ideas, a framework of government, if not a perfect
system, at least, one that had the fewest imperfections; a

government that could satisfy the majority without totally
alienating the minority.

The Constitution itself was adopted under the federal
principle of state equality. The people in each of the

thirteen states were to determine for themselves to adopt
or reject the Constitution as presented by the Convention.

The state equality principle treats all states with equal
respect and fairness; the federal districting system
divides the nation into smaller districts, and requires

that votes be cast for national officers in states or
parts of states. The whole is composed of distinct parts;

votes may not be combined across state lines; the majority
of states could not decide for the minority.
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Today, as then, the common rights of people in states

are recognized. The state equality principle is recognized
in the Senate with two elected officers from each state,

no matter what the population size. The same principle is

recognized ratifying amendments to the Constitution, where

states are granted only one vote, regardless of size. The
federal principle is the base on which all three branches
of government are founded. The federal principle limits

the will of the majority,

since it places barriers around

votes, adding a distribution requirement to that of a

simple majority.
In a large nation with diverse populations, there
must be a balance between national and local interests.

Local governments with local problems, a part of a larger

society, could not be protected by a simple majority

representation of one-man, one-vote. An unstructured
majority will tend to overlook local interests. Creating a

government on the federal principle, one made up of
representatives who speak for the interests of people in
separate states, means that the government will be
sensitive to local needs and rights. Applying these

principles to the office of president is important in

keeping a response to state viewpoints. A candidate cannot
win a simple majority of the popular votes, he must win
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states.,He must seek consensus by building a broad

coalition of local interests.
The inclusion of the federal principle is essential
to create political majorities, which are open to all

voters. Compromise is essential in a large heterogeneous
society, such as the United States. States must compromise

at the state level with the many and varied interests to
form state and local majorities. The federal principle
reminds people that they live together in community, that
they have civic interests that transcend private

interests. They must compromise ,to elect representatives
I
to the national government. The national interest is
defined by the representatives of public minorities. To
use the federal districting system rather than a one-man,

one-vote plan means that the results will come closer to
the common good.

An important concept of the federal principle is that
it protects the separation of powers.

"Without the federal

principle, the separation of powers will fail"

(Best,

1975,'p. 39). One-man, one-vote is not enough to keep the

representatives faithful to the majority or plurality of

the people. If everyone had the same interests, or if

government decisions affected all alike, there would be no

problem, but what is a benefit to some is a burden to
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others. To avoid conflict or revolution, the burdens must
be reasonable. Since representatives are responsible to

those who elect them, they may be faithful to "an unjust

master,- to a majority who would act like a band of
robbers"

(Best,

1975, p. 40). In a proper federal system,

one party will not control the whole government,

since

members of government do not owe allegiance to a national
party, but rather to local and state parties, which will
tend to protect minorities from majorities.

Although one party may nominally control the
government, the separation of powers will still work. The

controlling party must compromise with the minority party,

even within his own party, to achieve success in getting
his programs passed.

The will of the majority to be rightful must be
reasonable. Reasonable majorities are created by
a process of opposite and rival interests by
representatives who have both the means and the
motives to check each other, and the federal
principle structures the popular vote in such a
way as to supply a goodly part of the motives.
The federal principle balances the national and
local interests, gives us a moderate, inclusive,
political definition of national interest, and
supports the separation of powers, thereby
prevents majority tyranny. (Best, 1975, p. 41)
An example of compromise between majority and

minority parties appeared in a recent periodical entitled:
Senate Votes to Ban Drilling in National
Monuments. The Democrat-led Senate voted
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Wednesday to bar coal mining, and oil and gas
drilling inside federally protected National
Monuments in the West, dealing a fresh blow to
President Bush's energy production plans. The
57-48 roll call aligned the Senate with the
House which voted last month to ban mineral
extraction from the Monuments after Democrats
(minority) there won support from moderate
Republicans (majority), (The Desert Sun, 2001)
Madison details the real character of the new

government by outlining the foundation on which it was to
be established, the sources, extents and operation of its

powers, and the authority by which future changes in the

government may be made. First, the Constitution is to be
ratified by the people, but not as individuals, but by

states to which they belong, thus establishing that the
Constitution will not be a national, but a federal act.

Ratification is to result, not from a majority of the

people, nor from a majority of the states, but must result
from the unanimous agreement of the several states. Each

state is considered a sovereign body,

independent from all

others. The new constitution will then be a federal, not a
national constitution. The government appears to be of

mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as
national features. He concludes:

;

The proposed Constitution, therefore, when
tested by the rules laid down by its
antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a
national nor a federal constitution, but a
composition of both. In its foundation it is
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federal, not national; in the sources from which
the ordinary powers of government are drawn, it
is partly federal, and partly national; in the
operation of these powers, it is national, not
federal; in the extent of them, again, it is
federal, not national; and finally, in its
authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it
is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
(Publius, 1961, p. 214)

35

CHAPTER FOUR
IS THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

UNDEMOCRATIC?

Critics of the Electoral College emerge from two
distinct camps. First, those who condemn tangible elements
of the system, as faithless electors, the contingency

election, or the unit-vote principle. Such denunciations
are based on actual events and happenings with real causes

and effects. These can and should be addressed by a
citizenry that has experienced many changes since the
ratification of the Constitution in 1788. Second, there

are those who assault the intangibles,

the principles,

indulging in such name-calling as undemocratic, ambiguous,
archaic, even dangerous. Subjective opinions are more
difficult to analyze and assess as one attempts to

separate bias and prejudice from logical thinking.

Martin Diamond has attempted to do just this,

providing answers to The American Bar Association's
charges that the Electoral College is archaic,
undemocratic, complex, indirect and dangerous. Whatever is

old is not necessarily archaic. Not only is the Electoral

College not archaic,

it is the very model of up-to-date
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flexibility. Since its ratification, the Electoral College
has shown great adaptability.

Electors have become nullities; presidential
elections have become dramatic national
contests; the federal elements in the process
have been strengthened by the general-ticket
practice; modern mass political parties have
developed; campaigning moved from rather rigid
sectionalism to the complexities of a modern
technological society - all occurring tranquilly
and legitimately within the original
constitutional framework, as modified by the
Twelfth Amendment. (Diamond, 1977, p. 46)
It is remarkable that, while it now operates in

transformed ways,

it still operates as the founding

fathers intended. From the very beginning, the Electoral
College was intended to operate democratically.
Independent electors as a substitute for direct popular

election were chosen as a nationalizing substitute for the
state legislatures. Confederalists had fought to have the

president selected by state legislatures. Madison, James
Wilson and Gouvernor Morris devised the Electoral College
system to fend off the confederalizing threat. Thus, it

was not an undemocratic, but an anti-states-rights
stratagem to give the election to the people instead of to

the politicians.

Given the poor communications of the country at that

time,

it was feared that the people could not have the

information necessary to make an intelligent choice of
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available candidates. Another fear was that ordinary

voters, lacking broad knowledge of candidates, would vote
for favorite sons, making large-state candidates the
winners.

Substituting electors precluded the difficulty of the
wide discrepancies in suffrage laws in the states. The
right of suffrage was much more dispersed in the North
than the South, where the slaves were not counted as

"persons". Again, the intention of the founding fathers
was to find the most practical means for the selection of

the president, not to subvert democracy.
The essential spirit of the Electoral College, as
that of the Constitution, was democratic from the start.

The Electoral College is not an archaic institution;
because of its adaptability to change,

it remains the most

valuable means for selecting the chief executive.

Reformers who abhor the federal aspect of the
Electoral College fail to see that democracy is not the

question; the choice is whether to select the president in
a partly federally democratic, or a wholly nationally

democratic way.

The discrepancy between the electoral and popular

votes exists in all districted forms of election. Because
populations are not evenly distributed in numbers or

38

political sentiments, then it is possible that a winner of

a majority of the districts may not always be the winner
of the popular vote. When considering the advantages to be
gained by the present system, the chance of a "wrong
winner" is'worth taking. First, there is democratic

responsiveness to local interests, needs, and sentiments.
The American idea of democracy includes responsiveness to

local majorities. A nation of a multiplicity of interests,
ethnic groups, religions and races must be responsive to

minorities. Americans cherish the guarantee that the
districting principle provides; they accept the risk of a
national popular-vote district-vote discrepancy because

the advantages are many, and because the House and Senate
are nationally democratic enough to sustain a reasonable

standard of democracy (Diamond, 1977). Elections in the
United States House of Representatives, as in the

California Assembly and Senate, are districted elections.
The fundamental premise of American democracy is that
democracy, as in all other forms of government, cannot be
a completely ideal system. The political system must be

democratic enough, and then modified to include other

vital considerations important to all its citizens.
The undemocratic threat of the Electoral College

posed by its detractors, then, is that the possibility of
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50 percent minus one would win over 50 percent plus one.

The direct vote plan contains the provision that 40

percent of the votes would be enough to declare a winner.

Which, then,

is the more democratic?

Democracy is not at stake in our elections, only
the decision as to which of the shifting portion
of an overall democratic electorate will
temporarily capture executive office. What
serious difference does it make to any
fundamental democratic value if, in such
elections, 50 percent minus one of the voters
might-very infrequently-win the presidency from
50 percent plus one of the voters. (Diamond,
1977, p. 57)
To revise the Constitution for such a reason would

deplete democracy of all socioeconomic significance.
In answer to the charge of complexity, it should be

pointed out that complexity characterizes the entire

political system. The bicameral nature of Congress is
complex,

federalism is complex, judicial review is

complex, executive veto is complex, and the Bill of Rights
contains numerous complexities. Are these to be condemned

also? The American idea of government is not as concerned
with a majoritarian democracy as it is with a system,

which, while being democratic enough, albeit complex,

still fulfills other worthwhile purposes.
The Electoral College has delivered exceptionally

clear and unambiguous electoral decisions. No electoral
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system can be totally free of ambiguities, especially in
closely'divided elections, but the present system, when a

realistic, rather than an ideal standard is applied, must
be rated as highly successful. Compared to the direct

plan,

it appears to be less ambiguous. The direct plan,

with its single electoral district, provides for a runoff

election, if the candidate receives less than 40 percent
of the total vote. The problem of error and fraud could

very well be enhanced under this system; every precinct

would come under minute scrutiny, as candidates fought for
winning votes. Under the Electoral College system,
challenges are infrequent, and limited in scope. The
outcomes of elections are always accepted by the losing
candidate and by all the American people as legitimate.

Dangers in the Electoral College system, cited by

reformists are faithless electors, or the contingency
election in the House of Representatives, but the main
fear is the popular-vote, electoral-vote discrepancy. This

has been alluded to as a loaded pistol pointed at our
heads. However,

in 1888, when it did go off, the country

didn't turn a hair; the country was rewarded with a
strong,

stable, tranquil,

legitimate government. And in

the 2000 election, the day after the inaugural of George
W. Bush, who lost the popular vote to Al Gore by a small
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percentage, the administration began the task of
governance, the citizenry returned to its business of

earning a living, and once again the federal democratic
form of presidential election was safe and secure, at

least for an another four years.
The democratic foundations of the political system
are not endangered by the remote possibility of a
popular-vote electoral-vote discrepancy.
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CHAPTER FIVE

ELECTORAL COLLEGE SURVIVAL

Since the Convention of 1787, none of the hundreds of

reform efforts to abolish the Electoral College system has

succeeded. Whether this is due to the benevolent wisdom of
government dignitaries, or to political expediency is a
moot question; nevertheless, the federal

democratic-republic,

including the method of selecting the

chief executive has survived. The district plan, the

proportional plan, the direct plan, plus a myriad of

hybrid plans have all been found wanting in one element or
another; today, the direct popular vote system is the only

plan still promoted.

"None completely preserves the basic

elements of federalism and the constitutional compact; and

none would preserve the two-party system, discourage

factionalism, and still produce, at the possible risk of a
constitutional crisis, a clear result in a presidential

election"

(Hardaway, 1994, p. 163). Yes,

it is possible

that a minority candidate may win an election. However,

before the 2000 election, there had been only three
elections,

(1824, 1876, 1888), where the winner lacked

both the greatest number of popular votes, as well as a

majority of popular votes. One of these, that of 1876, is
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doubtful because of fraud. There have been only two
elections,.in 1800 and 1824, decided in a contingency

election in the House of Representatives. The likelihood
of winning the popular, but not the electoral vote prompts
candidates to seek the support of broad, nation-wide

groups

(Best, 1996).

The faithless elector still has protection under the

Constitution; he has freedom of choice in the election
process, yet is constrained by popular opinion and party
loyalty. Faithless electors have never yet stolen an

election or defeated the will of the people. Out of 16,000

votes cast, only eight have ever voted against the

candidates to whom they were pledged; not one has had any
effect whatsoever on the outcome of an election.

Twenty-four states bind their electors, and five states
assess penalties for breaking pledges. As long as states
have undisputed power for choosing electors, and stay

within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment, they may

exercise the right to refuse any unpledged elector (Best,

1996) .
In 1958, a period of upheaval and confrontation in

American life, Walter Lippman wrote that,

"the country has

entered a period of revolutionary change of which no one
can foresee the course or the end or the consequences"
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Bickel, 1971, p.

90). He was discussing the obsolescence

of the two-party system. Bickel has a more positive

attitude toward the revolutionary factions which were

quite vociferous at that time.

"The work of politics in

the United States, and the work of politics even for those

who set radical goals, is most effectively and enduringly
done within the regime, not in opposition to it as such;

within the system whose improvement I advocate, but which
I praise"

(Bickel, 1971, p. 90,

91). In the years

following the radical sixties, the Electoral College
remains alive and well; elections are decided in a timely,

consistent manner without the occurrence of revolutions.
We are well served by an attachment to
institutions that are the products more of
accident than design, or that no longer answer
to their original purposes and plans, but that
offer us comfort of continuity, and challenge
our resilience1and inventiveness in bending old
arrangements to present purposes with no outward
change....We have, of course, many institutions
which no longer,conform to the -original scheme,
and we have bent most of them quite effectively
to purposes of our present society....The fact
that we have used them without modifying their
structures has lent stability to our society and
has built strength and confidence in our people.
(Bickel, 1958, p. 3)

The Electoral College has been charged as no longer

performing according to the intentions of the framers. The
procedures in place today, built on the system outlined in

the Constitution are a product of tradition and trial and
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error over the last two centuries. The courts, state
legislatures, Congress, and the major political parties

have all been instrumental in adjusting the electoral
system to the changing times and moods of today's
citizens, but within the system, not in procedures yet

untried. In spite of changes, the federal nature of the
Constitution as

Madison expressed it succinctly in 1787 still
resounds forcefully today:

Cool and candid people will at once reflect that
the purest of human blessings must have a
portion of alloy in them; that the choice must
always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at
least of the greater, not the perfect, good; and
that in every political institution, a power to
advance the public happiness involves a
discretion which may be misapplied and abused.
They will see, therefore, that in all cases
where power is to be conferred, the point first
to be decided is whether such power be necessary
to the public good; as the next will be, in case
of an affirmative decision, to guard as
effectually as possible against a perversion of
the power to the public detriment. (Publius,
1961, p. 213, 214)
Madison realized that the Electoral College system

for electing the president was not perfect, but the issue

is comparative merit, not absolute merit. Compared to the
other selection processes offered to date, the present
method seems to contain less imperfections.
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Conclusion Mending the Flaws
Although it is preferable to the many reform
propositions offered, the Electoral College system is not

without flaw. There are six areas which need to be
addressed. First, and most often cited,

is the faithless

elector, which could be remedied by an automatic plan,
that eliminates the office of elector by automatically

awarding electoral votes to the candidates receiving a

plurality of votes within a state. Additionally, a less
intrusive method to manage the faithless elector problem

would be by an amendment which would give Congress the
right to change the faithless elector's vote to the

candidate to which the elector was pledged.
Secondly, the Constitution should be amended to
require each state to adopt the general-ticket ballot. The

general-ticket, winner-take-all procedure has provided the

Electoral College with a means for maintaining and
nurturing the two-party system, discouraging factionalism,

and producing a clear and timely winner for over two

centuries, and should be made mandatory for all the

states. This would eliminate the potential danger of
states manipulating the electoral system for political
ends ]
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Third, the contingent election in the House of

Representatives should be retained (this is not in
agreement with some reformers), but should be more
specifically interpreted. Should the incumbent House of

Representatives or the incoming House elect the president?
There should be a clear-cut decision between the two, not
leaving it to chance. Also, there should be a
clarification with each state delegation as to whether the
winning votes should be by majority or plurality. The

present choice of three should be changed to the two top
candidates, reducing the possibility that the vice

president chosen in the Senate would be of the opposition
party.
The quorum requirements in both Senate and House

contingency elections should be reduced. With no quorum
requirement, most, if not all members of Congress would
choose to attend the contingency election of the

president. There should be a specific date for the
election, both in the Senate and in the House, holding the

House election first. All votes should be open, rather
than by secret ballot. These changes would reduce the
inducement for political mischief or fraud.

Fourth, all American citizens should be enabled to
cast their votes for electors. At present, only the fifty
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states and the District of Columbia may appoint electors.

The District of Columbia could be designated as storehouse
for the votes of all citizens not now citizens of a state,
and the District of Columbia should count all these votes

according to Constitutional rules.
Fifth, although states have adopted the popular

election method for choosing electors,

it should not be

left to the choice of states. The Constitution should be
amended to provide that electors be chosen by popular
election in each state.

Sixth, in the certification of electoral votes, each
state should be required to provide a method for settling

controversies over electoral votes within the state. A
decision should be made between the incumbent governor, or

governor-elect as to whom should certify electoral votes.

"The electoral votes as certified by the government should

be absolutely final; Congress should not to second-guess
the governor of a State"

(Hardaway, 1994, p.

167).

Best recommends the automatic plan of selecting the

president by eliminating altogether the Electoral College,
but retaining the electoral votes. In addition to solving
I
the ^problem of the faithless elector, the automatic plan

would be instrumental in clarifying problems that might
arise because of the death or resignation of a
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presidential candidate. If a candidate dies, or resigns

after the general election in November, and the meeting on
the first Monday following the second Wednesday in

December, there is no provision for this contingency.

If a

Constitutional amendment abolishing the office of elector,
and the electoral votes were awarded automatically, this

defect would be eradicated, and the vice president-elect
would succeed to the office automatically (Best,

1975).

These changes could be made without altering the

basic federalist composition of the electoral process, or
reducing its advantages. They would eliminate the

possibility of conflict and uncertainty in the event of
unusual or unanticipated occurrences in the election

process.
Glennon suggests that the objective, or value sought

should determine the means of selection of the chief
executive. He believes that the principle objective should
be enhanced legitimacy, together with the reinforcement of

the values of federalism (Glennon,

1922). The objectives

decided upon, then, should be determined by their effects

upon a particular system. If all essentials, such as

Glennon discusses are seriously considered, then it is
wise to err on the side of caution, to retain a system
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that has been tried and found to be exemplary in its

comportment.
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